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Abstract
Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have a significant capability to choose how to imple-
ment their decisions to be effective, given the mix of managerial autonomy, supervisory powers 
and political independence that most of these agencies enjoy. As such, traditional approaches 
which focus on their institutional characteristics or their reputational problems do not fully 
capture the variation in IRAs’ behavior. This paper suggests a complementary approach to in-
terpreting IRAs’ autonomous behavior, focusing on the possibilities that the practice of ac-
countability offers to these public agencies to make relevant choices for the agency itself and 
the policy environment. To that end, we identify a key background variable that affects the 
practice of IRAs, namely, the varying power configurations existing among the regulatees and 
focus on how this factor shapes their voluntary accountability in different contexts. Lastly, we 
examine several cases of IRA accountability behavior to discuss whether the patterns we sub-
mit might constitute a starting point for a theoretical development on the use of accountability 
by IRAs.
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Introduction
Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have spread around the world in recent decades, re-
flecting a broader trend where the contemporary administrative apparatus increasingly accom-
modates technocratic expertise and unelected officials who are not—directly or indirectly—ac-
countable to the electorate (Vibert 2007). A large amount of research seeks to explain their 
emergence, diffusion, institutional variations, performance, and many other aspects of them 
(Gilardi 2008, Jordana et al. 2018). However, studying the behavior of regulatory agencies 
requires further attention since IRAs are quite unique, given the mix of managerial autonomy, 
supervisory powers and political independence that most of them enjoy. 
To this end, this paper offers a new perspective for the study of IRAs’ behavior, providing a 
conceptual framework to make sense of variations in the implementation of agencies’ account-
ability due to existing power asymmetries among regulatees and agencies’ risks perceptions of 
their accountability choices. The suggested conceptual framework allows us to propose a typol-
ogy of accountability outcomes based on these two dimensions when they activate account-
ability tools beyond legal requirements. The different accountability outcomes we identify are 
illustrated with five episodes of agency behavior, showing the value-added of the proposed 
typology to better explain agency choices in dealing with accountability. In our theoretical dis-
cussion, we also take into account that agencies’ behavior combines two different goals: repu-
tation-building, which aims at long-term agency survival, and mandate achievement, whereby 
agencies seek to perform short- and mid-term regulatory objectives. Accordingly, we suggest 
that accountability choices may be influenced by how these goals are prioritized by IRAs’ lead-
ership.        
To date, existing works have focused on unpacking the accountability of IRAs (Baldwin et.al. 
2012, Black 2008, Biela and Papadopoulos 2014, Fernandez-i-Marin et al. 2015, Koop 2011, 
2014, May 2007, Magetti 2010, Scott 2000) by looking at the direction of relationship between 
IRAs and their stakeholders, or identifying the variables affecting their strength. Going beyond 
these studies, we detail a framework for analysis that zooms on IRAs’ capability to decide on 
the use of accountability mechanisms, considering the varying power configurations among 
agency regulatees -the most relevant stakeholders for IRAs. Power asymmetries exist in all 
regulated sectors: big firms vs. emerging ones, well-organized groups of consumers vs. unor-
ganized ones, concentrated vs. fragmented producers, to name a few. In this study, we broadly 
identify regulatees as those actors directly or indirectly affected by the regulatory decisions of 
the agency, including producers, sellers, consumers and final users, and their collective action 
initiatives. Within this framework, we lay the groundwork for an analysis of agencies’ behavior, 
highlighting the importance of decisions on expanding or restraining the use of accountability 
related to their discretionary decision-making processes as a relevant tool to make them more 
effective.  
The debate over IRAs’ accountability mechanisms emerged in response to concerns over the 
disruption of classical accountability relationship towards the executive in democratic regimes 
following the expansion of these agencies (Biela 2014, Black 2008, Maggeti 2010, Jordana 
et al. 2015). Scholars suggest that IRAs need to establish credible accountability mechanisms 
to be able to pursue agency goals, either to protect themselves against political intervention 
(Koop 2014), sustain a positive reputation (Busuioc and Lodge 2015), or advance their regula-
tory mandate (Eriksen 2020). Agencies engage in accountability practices because this is man-
datory for them as part of the formally established laws and regulations, but they can also ex-
pand their accountability by means of voluntary practices, which may be internally formalized 
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or fully informal. In this sense, IRAs are faced with the choice to develop and expand voluntary 
forms of accountability under very different circumstances.
Voluntary accountability refers to agencies’ commitment to provide information and explana-
tions about their actions to other actors, without any legal requirement. According to Koop, 
voluntary accountability is “the degree to which an actor is, without being required to, com-
mitted to offering information on, and explanation of, his or her own conduct to another actor, 
and may be sanctioned for this conduct” (Koop 2014, p.565). Existing empirical research has 
largely concurred that accountability practices of IRAs often go beyond established require-
ments (Baldwin et.al. 2012; Schillemans 2008; Verhoest et al. 2010; Koop 2014, Verschuere et 
al. 2006). There are regular patterns of agency commitment to accountability practices that are 
not required by law (Busuioc 2013; Busuioc and Lodge 2015; Koop 2014; Puppis et.al. 2014; 
Schillemans 2011). These can include shared but usually unwritten norms that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels such as bilateral exchanges 
with different entities and organizations,  open conferences or specialized workshops, issuing 
of press releases, disclosing minutes and relevant reports, and/or introducing auditing and 
complaint procedures beyond the formal requirements. At the same time, these exchanges of-
ten take place in diverse environments characterized by varying degrees of power asymmetries 
among the regulatees.
How do these power asymmetries affect the voluntary accountability behavior of the agen-
cies? Under what conditions do IRAs become more sensitive to such power inequalities? In 
response to these questions, we suggest that the logic followed by independent agencies is 
driven by two background dynamics that are not immediately observable. First, we expect that 
IRAs will deliver more voluntary accountability to regulatees, with different modalities, when 
power asymmetries existing among them are higher.  Second, we argue that this may also be 
shaped by the risks related to the use of voluntary accountability, as perceived by the agency 
itself. The agency behavior may change depending on their assessment of risks, considering 
also how these uncertainties may have an impact on the agency goals they value most. This is 
because the agency aims to defend its decisions, to advance its mandate, but also to strengthen 
its existential purpose, and safeguard its reputation. 
In the remaining sections, we develop an interpretative framework to make sense of voluntary 
accountability practices by IRAs, suggesting that these are employed to cope with the difficul-
ties that inequalities among regulatees create to implement their regulatory decisions. The 
next section presents the conceptual agenda in more detail. We discuss the formation of IRAs’ 
preferences to perform voluntary accountability outside their formal institutional design. This 
helps us to better assess agency choices on their accountability front and observe under which 
circumstances they seek to strengthen (or weaken) voluntary accountability mechanisms. The 
following section unpacks power configurations as a background condition affecting IRAs’ 
strategies to modulate their accountability practices. Thereafter, we provide five examples de-
tailing accountability practices under different power configurations and show how our con-
ceptual framework on the voluntary accountability of agencies can be applied to better un-
derstand agencies’ behavior. Finally, we conclude with some remarks on the implications of 
analyzing accountability as a component of IRAs’ strategic actions. 
Accountability of IRAs: why is it important?
Within the realm of traditional public administration, civil servants remain accountable to 
elected politicians by means of hierarchical subordination (Bovens et al. 2014, Przeworski et 
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al. 1999). However, administrative innovations in the past few decades have weakened this 
relationship, creating “transactional authority” based exchanges, which rest on the premise 
of “bargaining and mutual exchange that reflects a partnership—albeit sometimes a contest-
ed one—between the principal and its agent” (Carpenter and Krause 2015, 8). This approach 
abandons the premise of a dominant hierarchical relation, as is expected for agents within the 
Weberian administrative state, and suggests that public agencies may have a certain degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy. However, while many public agencies are increasingly involved in such 
complex relations, they still remain accountable to the authorized executive unit that controls 
the agency. 
To the extent that most public agencies are politically accountable to elected officials, they 
establish a relationship in which they exchange information, and have a duty to justify and 
to defend their behavior, eventually facing consequences or rewards (Bovens 2007). These ac-
countability exchanges promote arrangements that curb the actors’ capacity to deviate from 
politicians’ policy priorities, even in the absence of a strong hierarchical subordination. This 
also has an impact on reinforcing agencies’ accountability towards their stakeholders. As point-
ed out by Schillemans (2008), such accountability relationships are effective because they run 
in the shadow of hierarchy. In other words, the existence of accountability mechanisms for 
agencies within the political sphere is what establishes a credible threat for the agency, albeit 
an indirect one. Schillemans argues that inadequate accountability with stakeholders may re-
activate the “political” accountability relationship and trigger serious consequences for agen-
cies. Thus, it can be argued that agencies cultivate accountability with stakeholders as a way 
to prevent or neutralize potential impacts derived from such “political” feedback effects, and 
stakeholders are also aware of such potential impacts that reveal the “vulnerability” of agen-
cies. This dynamic makes their accountability relationship credible.              
Contrary to most public agencies, however, IRAs’ “political” accountability relationship tends 
to be very weak, reducing the shadow of hierarchy effect as conceptualized by Schillemans. The 
formal “political” accountability of IRAs is very limited, often involving only regular, pro-forma 
presentations of reports and hearings to the legislature (Koop and Hanretty 2018, Verschuere 
et al. 2006). In fact, these bodies exhibit distinct institutional characteristics within the public 
realm, including protections against political interferences in their regulatory operations (Gi-
lardi and Maggetti 2011, Hanretty & Koop 2012, Jordana et al. 2018). Therefore, IRAs are con-
spicuously different from most public agencies on the accountability front, and consequently, 
their accountability relationship operates on a different logic. 
Under these circumstances, if accountability to the executive is feeble or even discontinued, 
and accountability to the legislative is limited, the complex association between “political” ac-
countability and stakeholders’ accountability expectations becomes quite difficult to balance. 
Thus, the shadow of hierarchy effect may be hardly operational - except for critical situations, 
for example when the termination of the agency is at the stake. Without this effect, regulatees 
should be unwilling to engage in an accountability relationship with IRAs since they would not 
be able to trigger “political” accountability when tensions emerge. Consequently, if regulatees 
do not perceive agencies’ “vulnerability”, they might search for alternative channels beyond 
IRAs to have a voice in the policy process. However, there is ample evidence that regulatees 
are strongly involved in accountability relations with IRAs (Fernandez-i-Marin et al. 2015), 
even beyond those legally defined (Koop 2014, Koop and Hanretty 2018). The question then 
becomes: under what circumstances do IRAs develop credible accountability vis-à-vis the regu-
latees in the absence of a shadow of hierarchy, and what are the consequences they face as a 
result of this?
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We argue that, to compensate the absence of the shadow of hierarchy effect, IRAs have to show 
some credible “vulnerability” when providing accountability to their regulatees. The practice of 
voluntary accountability in many cases serves this purpose. Busuioc and Lodge (2015) indicate 
that accountability responses of public agencies—in general—are primarily driven by reputa-
tion-related concerns, and “vulnerability” may involve, under certain conditions, putting their 
reputation at risk. However, we suggest in this paper that IRAs also employ accountability 
mechanisms for other purposes as well, not only to improve their reputation but to advance 
strategically the mandates they have (Eriksen 2020). Thus, in a context of weak or almost non-
existing shadow of hierarchy effect, when IRAs voluntarily account for their decisions, they 
may introduce some “vulnerability” in their decision-making process. In compensation, they 
will expect regulatees to be seriously involved in the implementation of agencies’ decisions. 
Under these circumstances, voluntary accountability of IRAs would further involve a strategic 
component to selectively influence regulatees’ behavior towards agencies.
For IRAs, developing a strategic capacity for managing voluntary accountability allows them 
to avoid potential threats to their regulatory decisions. Such accountability practices are aimed 
to shape regulatees’ attitudes and preferences by means of detailed information, discussions 
and deliberations, while revealing the agencies’ “vulnerabilities” to them. Consequently, our 
approach also focuses closely on the importance of identifying the accountability preferences 
of IRAs. Thus, agencies may commit to voluntary accountability, decide on how selective they 
should use it, and which instruments fit better to their context and capabilities. Options refer 
also to the introduction of accountability interfaces, allowing regulatees’ feedback on the in-
struments and policies adopted by the agency. Indeed, IRAs’ preferences on voluntary account-
ability should consider different options regarding how to frame regulatory problems, and how 
to justify the actions implemented by the agency, under the constraints placed by power con-
figurations existing among regulatees. After detailing the concept of voluntary accountability 
in the next section, we propose an interpretative framework to analyze how agency preferences 
on voluntary accountability are influenced by regulatees’ power asymmetries. 
Understanding IRAs’ voluntary accountability: a focus on the context 
IRAs have several important duties. On the one side, law-makers delegate statutory responsi-
bilities to them, including, but not limited to, information gathering, rulemaking, monitoring 
and control, enforcement, adjudication, and the implementation of rewards and sanctions over 
issues of market governance and other areas of public concern, such as risk regulation (Puppis 
et al. 2014). On the other side, most statutes of these agencies include legal provisions that 
guarantee independence from political intervention. This means their internal decision-mak-
ing processes are subject to special protections and the decisions they make cannot be arbitrar-
ily reversed. While public agency officials in managerial positions in traditional bureaucracies 
could be removed or replaced more easily, IRA board members have fixed-term mandates and 
cannot be removed from their post unless they violate specific terms of their appointment 
and/or commit a serious offense (Scott 2000). 
To be sure, IRA independence is a multidimensional concept that goes beyond statutory inde-
pendence and formal legal status, although there is not a clear consensus on how to measure 
and conceptualize it (Gilardi and Maggetti 2011). At the most basic level, this includes three 
key components: political independence, managerial autonomy, and regulatory responsibilities 
(Jordana et al. 2018). Depending on the combination of these elements, agency independence 
may vary, leading to diverse outcomes regarding the actual exercise of autonomy (Verhoest et 
al. 2004, Christensen and Laegreid 2006), and defining several institutional configurations, 
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ranging from fully independent entities to a variety of non- independent but autonomous 
agencies (Jordana et al. 2018). 
To the extent that they are independent, IRAs show different conventions than traditional 
public agencies for the management of accountability practices. However, higher independ-
ence does not mean greater accountability for all agencies.  From a recent dataset on the for-
mal characteristics of regulatory agencies world-wide, Figure 1 clearly illustrates a positive 
relationship between the formal requirements of accountability to stakeholders and the legal 
protections for agency independence, although not a very intense one: the dots, referring to 
country means of agencies, show the existing dispersion between these two dimensions.1 On 
the other side, if we only look at formal “political” accountability, it tends to be positively as-
sociated with low levels of agencies’ formal independence (Koop and Hanretty 2018).
Figure 1. The accountability and independence map of IRAs worldwide
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the use of voluntary accountability (or 
even the intensification of already existing formal mechanisms) could be used by IRAs to adjust 
their desired accountability levels in response to a particular situation, going beyond formal 
requirements. Independent agencies may use voluntary accountability under different circum-
stances, and this leads to a variation across agency practices. We should not expect a positive as-
1 — This finding is based on a dataset of legal characteristics of IRAs that reveals four main latent dimensions for the 
analysis of IRAs: managerial autonomy, political independence, public accountability and regulatory responsibilities 
(Jordana at al. 2018). The correlation coefficient between the independence and the accountability dimension is rela-
tively low: only 0.348 for the whole dataset, and 0.404 if we include only agencies from OECD countries. Each latent 
dimension is constructed by means of a factor analysis that includes several variables about the formal characteristics 
of agencies related to them and, in particular, the accountability dimension measures largely non-hierarchical mecha-
nisms. 
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sociation between the practice of accountability and agency performance either (as confirmed 
by Koop and Hanretty 2018), because accountability is not accumulative to the achievement of 
agency goals. Diminishing returns of accountability may indeed be the outcome in some cases 
of intense use, and we might even observe cases in which accountability mechanisms could be 
invoked by some regulatees to undermine agencies’ decision-making procedures. 
The independence enjoyed by regulatory agencies involves some flexibility as to how to use 
accountability tools, including the introduction of voluntary accountability, and this has conse-
quences on the strategic front. IRAs’ capabilities to make a calculated use of accountability, and 
to expand its content beyond legal requirements, are contingent on its independence, which 
allows them to use it as an instrument for strategic purposes. Significant levels of independ-
ence would be necessary to make choices on their own on this front, but agencies with moder-
ate levels of independence may be also capable of using voluntary accountability to advance 
their purposes. If an independent agency decides to reveal its decision-making procedures (for 
example, by revealing the entire document trail), in most cases there are no formal limitations 
that would prevent it from doing so. Similarly, if an IRA decides to strictly bound itself to the 
mandatory accountability requirements, it is also technically free to do so. In that sense, we 
claim that the agency behavior on the accountability front is strongly informed by the flexibil-
ity it enjoys thanks to its independence.
Varying power configurations
We argue that variation in the practice of voluntary accountability by IRAs is influenced by 
varying power configurations among regulatees, in addition to agency preferences regarding 
the level of risk that its decisions entail. The combination of these dynamics allows us to iden-
tify four different options, as detailed in Table 2. 
In regulatory policy, highly motivated large companies face the many and usually less informed 
small firms operating in the same markets (Dal Bo 2006, 220). Power asymmetries among 
them are observed when the former can easily cover costly litigation processes, obtain access 
to the legislature through multiple lobbying procedures, or even influence public servants via 
effective media pressure, while the latter do not have such capabilities or their costs are much 
higher.  In addition, the performance of IRAs depends on business’ regulatory compliance, and 
most often this requires a positive involvement of firms already dominating the markets or 
policy areas under regulation, while new entrants, eventually bringing innovations to the sec-
tor, are in a much weaker position in this respect. 
In addition to firms, there are other regulatees—such as end users and consumers—who are 
indirectly influenced by the regulatory decisions. This group includes many individuals that 
are often poorly informed and less organized to compensate power asymmetries vis-à-vis large 
producers and service providers. 
This diversity among the regulatees to process information, demand explanations and exert 
direct or indirect pressure suggest that asymmetric power configurations are quite important 
in the regulatory process. After all, not all regulatees are equally powerful and—in certain is-
sue areas—some matter more than others (Busuioc and Lodge 2015, Carpenter and Krause 
2012). In that sense, some actors may face major difficulties to push the agency to be more ac-
countable when contradictory views and diverse interests prevail (Bovens 2007). Under these 
circumstances, the existence of collective action problems may prevent some actors from being 
active in participatory platforms (Biela and Papadopoulos 2014, 7, Guidi 2015, 117), and even 
generate additional costs in case of openly criticizing the agency. When this is the case, IRAs 
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are not only passive recipients of their regulatees’ demands but they also may employ volun-
tary accountability more strategically as a way to reinforce their decision-making power. 
Inspired by Wilson’s definition of regulatory policy (1980), we schematically detail different 
power configurations among regulatees and suggest that these can be divided in two groups: 
producers and sellers, who are supply-driven, vs. consumers and final users, who are demand-
driven. Clearly, this involves some simplification, but it is heuristically necessary to advance 
a conceptual framework on IRAs’ voluntary accountability. Except for very large firms with 
near-monopoly power, most regulatees face collective action dilemmas to cope with asymmet-
ric power configurations in their domain. Each policy area and issue leads to a different power 
configuration among regulates. This may be due to the market structure, the position of the 
firms and their structural power within this environment. In that sense, consumers and users 
may have insufficient capacity for collective action, while producers and suppliers may face 
collective action problems due to their internal competition2. This leads to distinct power con-
figurations, ranging from low to strong asymmetries among regulatees (Table 1). 
Table 1: A map of power configurations involving regulatees and market structure
Regulatees





Dispersed Low asymmetric configurations Moderate asymmetric configuration
Source: The Authors
As Table 1 reveals, when regulatees are organized, capable of resolving collective action prob-
lems and mobilizing resources, asymmetries in power configuration still exist because of the 
market structure, but tend to be moderated or low. Under these circumstances, IRAs can rely 
on more efficient tactics, playing firms off against one another to release information on costs, 
balance sheet specifics and drastically lowering existing power asymmetries between compa-
nies and their beneficiaries. For example, if consumer groups or small firms lack access to infor-
mation on the real costs and production strategies employed by large firms, agencies may like 
to challenge these companies to release some of this information. However, if the consumers 
or emerging firms are unorganized, while large companies dominate the market structure, this 
leads to the prevalence of strong power asymmetries. Additionally, when a few large companies 
do not dominate the market and other regulatees are not sufficiently organized to cope with 
the regulatory process, the power asymmetry configuration tends to be moderate.
We argue that choices on the voluntary accountability by IRAs are conditioned by the asym-
metry of power configurations existing in a regulatory regime. As a tentative proposition, we 
expect that voluntary accountability mechanisms will be used intensively if power asymme-
try is strong. If asymmetry is low, we suggest that the use of accountability will remain at a 
2 — The literature on collective action and interests’ groups is extremely large and rich, departing from the seminal 
work of Mancur Olson (1965), and we do not intend to discuss this extensively in this paper, but merely indicate that 
the collective action of regulatees has to be taken into account when examining their asymmetric power, in addition to 
more structural conditions shaped by markets and institutions. 
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more moderate level. This attempt to link power dynamics into the study of accountability 
in IRAs also follows Keohane’s understanding of accountability as a power relationship (Keo-
hane 2006), but introducing an interactive perspective based on the fact that IRAs have to be 
open to some “vulnerability” to make their accountability credible to regulatees, while IRAs’ 
accountability actions eventually may have an impact on the power configurations among 
regulatees. Asymmetries of power within regulatees influence agency incentives in modulat-
ing their voluntary accountability, making it less necessary when salience is less pronounced. 
When asymmetries are high, however, agencies would be more tempted to use their account-
ability instruments to address challenges to their regulatory decisions, for example by trying to 
undermine the influence of some regulatees acting as informal veto players. 
We suggest that agencies’ calculations about voluntary accountability also take potential reac-
tions of regulatees into account. This is not only influenced by their relationship to the agency, 
but also how the agency views the relations among them. In fact, some accountability deci-
sions may even have a second-order impact on the configuration of power asymmetries. Given 
the variety of power configurations involving regulatees, IRAs face numerous difficulties to 
navigate the murky waters of accountability without jeopardizing their relevance, status and 
reputation, making the challenges they confront highly relevant. For this reason, the practice 
of voluntary accountability involves some significant risks for IRAs. From this perspective, we 
consider that agencies’ leadership can be risk-averse, or risk prone in their voluntary account-
ability practices. In the first case, concerns about preserving the agency’s stability or reputa-
tion may dominate over actively using accountability tools to support its decisions, while in the 
second case, the agency will be committed to make their decisions effective, and this may result 
in a more selective use of voluntary accountability.
Table 2: Voluntary Accountability Outcomes
Asymmetric Power
Strong Moderate
Agency preferences Risk-averse Intense and generic Low and generic
Risk-prone Intense and selective Low and selective
Source: The Authors
When agency leadership tends to be risk-averse, they prefer to use voluntary accountability 
in a generic way, meaning that the instruments and the channels to account for agency ac-
tions and decisions to regulatees are expected to be of general concern, not focusing on the 
problems and needs of a particular group of regulatees.   We expect that in cases where agen-
cies exhibit greater propensity to take risks, they will be more selective in the use of their vol-
untary accountability instruments, aiming to influence some of their regulatees in particular 
- albeit that this will increase their potential vulnerability. In that sense, agencies can activate 
preferred channels and intensify the contents of voluntary accountability also to empower 
designated actors involved in the regulatory process. The motivation behind this strategy is to 
slightly alter the power configurations existing among regulatees, with the expectation that 
this would help to implement agency decisions more effectively, eliminating opposition and 
building a support base among the audiences.   
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The practice of voluntary accountability by IRAs
In this section, we focus on the determinants of voluntary accountability identified earlier 
and, using several examples, discuss how the power asymmetries and risk attitudes highlighted 
above may influence IRAs’ accountability decisions. We present five brief cases of the deliber-
ate use of voluntary accountability by regulatory agencies which range between very intense 
and very low. In each case, we identify how regulatees’ power asymmetries created distinct 
frames that influenced choices on voluntary accountability made by regulatory agencies and 
discuss how these power asymmetries tend to increase the intensity of voluntary accountabil-
ity. We also consider the preferences of the agency (which informs their strategies for the use 
of voluntary accountability) and whether they are risk-averse or risk prone. 
Our first case refers to a very intense use of accountability by IRAs, and the example comes 
from a study by Puppis et al. (2014), who find that financial, telecommunications and broad-
casting regulators in four Western European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ire-
land, and Switzerland) increasingly focus on informal communication over media platforms to 
interact with industry representatives and the public (Puppis et al. 2014, 397). This is a sector 
where mandatory accountability practices are already strong and effective, yet they appeared 
insufficient to the agency leadership. This is because regulatees interacted in a strong asym-
metric power environment: in finance and telecommunications, large firms dominating the 
market are disproportionately well-informed as opposed to small firms and consumer groups, 
which lack access to technical details. If IRAs frequently interact with large business groups on 
the basis of mandatory accountability, which give them a platform to voice their demands and 
respond to their concerns, they risk losing acceptance in the eyes of broader groups’ regulatees. 
To that end, IRAs in these countries have used public communication to effectively increase 
voluntary accountability (such as explaining and justifying their actions via mainstream me-
dia, trade journals, news agencies, contact with special analysts, and targeted dissemination 
of information via financial press), to be open to scrutiny by industry representatives and the 
general public alike (Puppis et.al. 2014, 400). In doing so, they placed great value on the public 
acceptance of the goals established for the agency, thanks to the broad reach of the new com-
munication tools. Here, we observe that voluntary accountability mechanisms were introduced 
widely with the purpose of leveling the playing field among stakeholders, but not selectively, 
keeping risks associated with this strategy quite low. 
A second case refers to a situation where voluntary accountability is quite low but selective. 
The example comes from Australia, where Murray–Darling Basin Authority—an independent 
regulatory agency responsible for managing water resources—relied on some voluntary ac-
countability measures (e.g. holding public events, producing factual brochures, commissioning 
scientific reports, providing the latest news on Basin events, organizing natural life preserva-
tion awareness weeks that brings interest groups together as well as producing regular up-
dates on drought conditions) in response to a strong backlash from the agricultural industry 
(including local communities whose livelihood depended on farming and fishing) against its 
preservationist policies (Wood 2015). In this particular case, selective voluntary accountability 
served as a “secondary mechanism for resetting the institutional base of the agency to rebuild 
its political legitimacy, since initial methods (the public consultation) encountered problems” 
(Wood 2015, 1027). Specifically, we observe that the use of selective voluntary accountability 
mechanisms emerged when the IRA perceived moderate asymmetry within the regulatees and 
users (unorganized preservationists on the one side, divided producers on the other), making 
voluntary accountability manageable and allowing the agency to be risk-oriented to advance 
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its goals. Thus, this appears to be the preferred practice to address some perceived problems of 
regulatory performance that pose a threat to agencies’ decision-making. 
Case 3 introduces an example of the intense use of voluntary accountability with selective 
strategies. In particular, we look at the experience of financial regulatory agencies in the US 
prior to the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. Critics suggest that asymmetries among regula-
tees induced by powerful industry players were the primary reason behind the accumulation of 
market risks, as conventional and shadow banking professionals carefully lured the regulatory 
agencies into believing that new financial products (such as mortgage-backed securities, credit 
default swaps and collateralized debt obligations) were safe and did not pose any systemic 
risk. While mandatory accountability measures of IRAs, including the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), appeared strong and solid, these were increasingly ineffective to prevent 
regulatory bias favoring the industry players, as the information provided lacked the necessary 
knowledge and expertise regarding the technical details of how these products were structured 
(Baker 2010). In particular, the skyrocketing profits reported by these actors during the 1990s 
allowed them to avoid closer inspection as long as profits kept on rising. This further enabled 
financial industry giants to mobilize and lobby for regulation designed to benefit their business 
model (Baker 2010, 651). 
The case of SEC stands as a clear example of strong power asymmetry, where small investors 
and consumers were almost absent from these debates. In response to this, the SEC decided 
to be more proactive and introduced ad-hoc, selective voluntary accountability measures to 
secure the flow of information across different public bodies by signing a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the FED, and the Department 
of Labor. However, these mechanisms were vastly useless in the absence of a statutory scheme 
that formally prevents the formation of a silo-effect from taking place.3 In addition, the SEC en-
gaged in several rounds of informal consultation with investors to ensure greater shareholder 
participation in financial company management and proposed proxy rules. Yet, these measures 
still favored large companies over ordinary shareholders and retail investors by keeping the 
required threshold of investment share too high—at %5—to permit effective exercise of share-
holder power, especially in large cap companies (Aguilar 2009).4  
In that sense, it can be argued that the looming power asymmetry prompted SEC to activate 
voluntary accountability mechanisms, targeting particular actors as a strategy to influence the 
existing power and information asymmetries. However, in this particular case, the voluntary 
accountability strategy was not enough to protect the interests of the consumers and also fos-
ter efficient market competition – and the potential risks taken by the SEC were fully revealed 
when the financial crisis broke out in 2008. Thus, the case of the SEC reveals that selectively 
expanding voluntary accountability is not always successful and can incur significant costs on 
the agency, involving higher risks. Accountability mechanisms were insufficient to induce a 
more effective financial regulation. Overall, this put the agency behavior under focus, and con-
tributed to the general questioning of its independent status for several years afterwards. 
3 — See “Testimony Concerning the Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the Credit Crisis for the Future of Regu-
lation” by Chairman Christopher Cox, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Before the Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, Thursday, October 23, 2008. https://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/2008/ts102308cc.htm
4 — Speech by SEC Commissioner: "Increasing Accountability and Transparency to Investors”, by Commissioner 
Luis A. Aguilar, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at "The SEC Speaks in 2009" Washington, 
D.C., February 6, 2009. Retrieved from: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609laa.htm
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The last two cases we include here refer to cases of low voluntary accountability practices. Case 
4 comes from independent central banks, which operate in an environment where stakehold-
ers are dispersed and disorganized. In one case, a risk-prone attitude in favor of transparency 
led central banks to use accountability selectively. This occurred when they revealed very de-
tailed information in their market forecasts. After inflation targeting became the key goal of 
most independent central banks worldwide, having many policy implications, most of these 
institutions began to publish openly their near-term expectations as a selective piece of in-
formation of great interest for some of their audiences. In some cases, however, revealing the 
process behind the calculation of these figures put the effective targeting at risk, as many reac-
tions anticipated such predictions. This was a risky strategy aimed to increase the efficiency 
of this central banks’ policy instrument, but repeatedly doing so raised further doubts when 
announced figures were revised within a short time frame, suggesting that central banks’ pre-
vious policy settings were a mistake and were creating a potential threat to their reputations 
(Mishkin 2004). 
Our final example—Case 5—is about the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its 
response to net-neutrality campaigns in the US, where the agency chose to restrict its vol-
untary accountability non-selectively because it has considered this could be a risk for the 
achievement of its regulatory goals, despite the presence of an average power asymmetry re-
garding the issue under dispute. Since 2014, large internet service providers lobbied to impose 
price hierarchies in broadband use and called on the FCC to reverse the equal access princi-
ple, while well-organized consumers, small businesses and start-ups opposed this proposal.5 
In response to their demands for greater transparency, however, FCC regulators deliberately 
toned down their responsiveness to public appeals, remained silent in the face of net-neutrality 
campaigns and refused to explain the reasons behind their decisions.6 To that end, the agency 
pushed forward to eliminate net-neutrality on June 11, 2018, and enabled broadband provid-
ers to impose price hierarchies on Internet use. The FCC defended this controversial decision 
by framing it in terms of effective governance of the market. Specifically, the chairman of FCC, 
the Ajit Pai, claimed that “the repeal will get rid of unnecessary and harmful Internet regula-
tions and help spur investment in 5G and other broadband networks.”7 In sum, this represents 
a case where limited, non-selective voluntary accountability was adopted as choice by the FCC 
because of its risk averse strategy and the moderate asymmetric power relationship existing 
among regulatees.
Conclusion
This paper has introduced a complementary framework to study the accountability of IRAs as a 
component of their premeditated behavior with a focus on the interaction between independ-
ent regulators and their regulatees. Overall, the framework developed in this paper outlines 
a roadmap to study the voluntary accountability practices of regulatory agencies in further 
detail, with an emphasis on the strategies that deal with regulatees power asymmetries. Im-
portantly, the use of voluntary accountability by IRAs can be influenced also by agency percep-
tions about risks related to their strategic options. Under these circumstances, the voluntary 
5 — For a recent campaign, see http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/11/29/public-comments-to-the-federal-commu-
nications-commission-about-net-neutrality-contain-many-inaccuracies-and-duplicates/, Accessed on October 5th, 
2018.
6 — See https://www.engadget.com/2017/12/11/hypocrisy-at-the-fcc-and-the-illusion-of-transparency/, Accessed on 
October 5th, 2018.
7 — See https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/05/net-neutrality-to-die-on-june-11-as-ajit-pai-blasts-special-
interests/, Accessed on October 5th, 2018.
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accountability of agencies can be either selective (addressing particular regulatees) or non-
selective, where the intensity of voluntary accountability also varies. 
As the discussion reveals, the examples we provide substantiate our expectations, underlining 
the fact that the voluntary accountability behavior of an IRA is related to the power configura-
tions among regulatees. Brief anecdotes reveal a concurrence between the theoretical predic-
tions and the common trends, meaning that strong power asymmetry induces a more active 
use of voluntary accountability, as the case of telecommunications agencies in Europe reveals 
(Case 1). In the same way, when an agency perceives that power asymmetry is low and is ready 
to take some risks, it may opt for a selective use of voluntary accountability to empower some 
of the regulatees (Case 2).  A more dangerous case emerges when power asymmetry is high 
and the agency is very active on the voluntary accountability front, behaving selectively to ad-
dress a particular problem (Case 3). Other examples reveal that under conditions of moderate 
asymmetry, the use of voluntary accountability tends to be limited and conditional on the risk 
perceptions of the agency (Cases 4 and 5). It must be added that these brief anecdotes are not 
meant to test any hypothesis, but rather to provide a brief mapping exercise to identify new 
avenues for testing the role of power asymmetries across a broader sample. In that sense, these 
are heuristic devices to illustrate the hypothesis-generating potential of the proposed research 
agenda.   
Clearly, more research is required to better understand the impact of asymmetric power config-
urations among regulatees in relation to IRAs’ accountability practices across different sectors 
and countries. For example, it is important to explore how IRAs cope with environments char-
acterized by strong power asymmetries, especially when a powerful actor uses a combination 
of negative and/or positive incentives to shape agencies’ practices and decisions in line with its 
own interests (Grabosky 1995a; 1995b). Under these circumstances, IRAs may use voluntary 
accountability selectively as a strategy to undermine the dominance of such powerful actors. 
When this is the case, voluntary accountability mechanisms may be targeted to empower spe-
cific constituencies, or specific regulatees in particular. However, risks for the agency in case of 
deciding to activate selective voluntary accountability are high, as they need to open spaces of 
“vulnerability” so as to be credible and engage the prioritized regulatees, but other actors may 
exploit this opportunistically. Their costs in terms of reputation and mandate accomplishment 
can be greatly elevated if such tactics turn out to be contradictory or unsustainable. Agencies 
may even face the risk that “political” accountability mechanisms could be reactivated, posing 
a threat of agency termination. 
Overall, it emerges that strong power asymmetries play an important role in the choice of 
voluntary accountability, which may influence the impact of agency decisions, if some regu-
latees do behave differently as a consequence. Thus, in such cases, as the example of the SEC 
illustrates, IRAs may confront a dilemma about choosing their best strategies: while some may 
be tempted to take some risks, others would prefer not to do so. It might be the case that using 
selective accountability in some environments may put effective regulation in danger, creating 
a risk for the achievement of agency goals. In those cases, risk-averse agencies will prefer non-
selective voluntary accountability mechanisms to avoid nurturing situations that could block 
agency goals. Under these circumstances, revealing agency preferences more in detail while 
paying attention to the context provides a better grasp of how IRAs navigate such dilemmas to 
improve their institutional profile. 
Our discussion is a first step towards a more systematic study of how IRAs strategically use 
accountability mechanisms. In this way, we suggest that for IRAs, the “shadow of hierarchy” 
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effect works differently than the way it would for conventional public agencies. For independ-
ent agencies, it is not the executive that activates institutional controls, but rather a combina-
tion of powers, including the legislative (and this is only activated in exceptional cases). Thus, 
to make accountability credible, IRAs have to reveal their vulnerability to regulatees in their 
exchanges, making such practices more exposed, but in defining their accountability strategies, 
agencies tend to choose the level of risk they like to operate under.  
Unlike the reputation framework, which characterizes many studies on accountability in pub-
lic agencies, our proposal presents a roadmap to study agencies’ voluntary accountably with a 
focus on the strategic considerations to advance their regulatory goals under uncertainty, tak-
ing into account the distribution of power among regulatees and their attitudes towards risk. 
Crucially, these practices cannot be simply framed as voluntary commitments of dutiful IRAs’ 
bureaucrats to improve their reputation among stakeholders avoiding risky decisions. They 
may have a substantive policy content. Depending on the mandatory accountability require-
ments and the nature of regulatees’ interactions, IRAs may actually feel constrained or com-
pelled to rely on distinct accountability strategies and to promote their different goals more 
intensively. However, the consequences of their choices can be relevant for the achievement of 
agency regulatory goals. In that sense, understanding IRAs’ voluntary accountability choices 
calls for an interpretative framework.
Finally, a focus on IRA accountability further speaks to studies that seek to understand the 
logic of decision-making in regulatory governance, including those across regulatory regimes, 
spaces and networks (Coen and Heritier 2005, Gonzalez 2017, Hancher and Moran 1989, Jor-
dana and Sancho 2004,). Often, IRAs’ accountability involves ex-post justifications of decisions 
that are taken after multiple interactions with stakeholders. This interactive component sug-
gests that IRAs—despite their independence—are not completely isolated when they reach 
critical decisions governing the market. Very importantly, these agencies are embedded in 
complex networks of actors and institutions. A better understanding of these contextual dy-
namics calls for further research that systematically problematizes power asymmetries among 
regulatees as a conditioning factor for agencies’ discretionary activities, such as the use of vol-
untary accountability.
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